Yesterday,
I posted an article
declaring how the mind is a fundamentally different kind of thing than the
brain. I wanted to follow up with a couple of possible objections to the
mind/brain distinction that people offer today. The first objection is known as emergence and its proponents claim that the mind, while different from the brain, emerges as the brain grows in complexity. Thus the mind is distinct from the brain but it is the evolution of the brain, growing more and more complex, that eventually produced the first mind.
Emergent properties are
familiar in both science and philosophy and they basically mean that the whole
cannot be described solely by describing its parts. For example, we can talk
about a snowflake by its chemical composition. A snowflake is comprised of
nothing more than H
2O in a solid state. However, describing the chemical
bonds that create H
2O does not describe a snowflake. The snowflake is
something more specific than the chemical reactions of H
2O, and thus a snowflake
is an emergent property of H
2O. Flocks of birds, molds, even societies are used
as examples of emergence, where these things are different than the sum of the
parts.
1
Materialists will then use this kind of
description to say that the mind may be an emergent property of the brain. It
exists because the brain's chemistry and electrical pathways are arranged in a
specifically complex fashion. Just as the molecules of water or the grouping of
people to form a city emerges as a new property that didn't exist in that
entity's building blocks, so the mind emerges as a new property of the brain's
makeup. Thus, they claim, the mind is a real property but it comes from the
physical structure and function of the brain. No soul is required.
The
Problems with Emergence
The explanation sounds good, but there are several
problems with the claim that the mind is emergent. First, in a complex system
where new properties emerge, those new properties fall into the same domain as
the system's constituent parts. In other words, any physical emergent
system will produce emergent properties that can be described physically. Water
may have properties that hydrogen and oxygen lack such as the ability to
crystallize into a snowflake. However, a snowflake is still describable by using
the chemical language of solid/liquid/gaseous states and crystalline structures.
The components are physical and the new property is also physical. Likewise,
cities emerge from groups of people getting together and choosing to live a
certain way. People are sociological and cities are described sociologically.
The mind however produces mental properties. As we've said, mental properties
are non-physical. Therefore there is still a difference in kind in the
property one is trying to account for. How does one account for non-physical
properties from purely physical substances?
Secondly, emergence runs into the
problem of impotence. J.P. Moreland notes that if the complexity of the brain
produces a mind "like fire produces smoke or the structure of hydrogen and
oxygen I water 'produce' wetness," then the mind is nothing more than an effect
of the brain and it therefore has no causal powers. J.P. writes that if this was
the case, "mental states are byproducts of the brain, but they are causally
impotent. Mental states merely 'ride' on top of the events in the brain."
2
If this is true, then we cannot change our minds,
really. We can only dance to the electro-chemical reactions that are happening
in our heads. In other words, we have no free will whatsoever! We are simply
victims to whatever processes our body and any outside events that we come in
contact with cause. We are not making decisions, but our brains, like so
many dominoes falling in a row, are just following the rules of chemistry and
physics. The mind is simply the smoke, but it's the fire of neurons in the brain
that's doing all the work.
The self-refuting nature of a material view of
self
Because a purely material origin for the mind leads to determinism, such
a description can be seen as contradictory. J.P. quotes from H.P. Owen who
says:
Determinism is self-stultifying. If my mental processes are totally
determined, I am totally determined either to accept or reject determinism. But
if the sole reason for my believing or not believing X is that I am causally
determined to believe it I have no ground for holding that my judgment is true
or false.3
I think Owen and Moreland are right
here. Much like the argument from reason, trying to relegate our conscious
awareness to the physical becomes a fool's errand of determinism and
contradiction. Such suggestions really don't explain why unique properties of
the mind exist and it leads us to conclude that no one really makes any free
choices. That's an awful lot to give away in order to escape the necessity of
the soul.
References